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Abstract
We consider a formal approach to comparative risk aversion and applies it to in-
tertemporal choice models. This allows us to ask whether standard classes of utility
functions, such as those inspired by Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974), Selden (1978), Ep-
stein and Zin (1989) and Quiggin (1982) are well-ordered in terms of risk aversion.
Moreover, opting for this model-free approach allows us to establish new general re-
sults on the impact of risk aversion on savings behaviors. In particular, we show that
risk aversion enhances precautionary savings, clarifying the link that exists between the
notions of prudence and risk aversion.
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1 Introduction
A common approach to study the role of risk aversion is to consider a particular class of
preferences, presumably well-ordered in term of risk aversion, and then analyze the decisions
that result from preferences within this class. In the context of intertemporal choice, a
number of different classes of utility functions have been considered. The most popular choice
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consists of preferences à la Epstein and Zin (1989), while the framework in Kihlstrom and
Mirman (1974) and Quiggin’s (1982) anticipated utility theory provide alternative settings.
It occurs that predictions about the impact of risk aversion radically depends on the model
that is chosen. For example, regarding the relation between risk aversion and precautionary
savings in a simple two-period model, the preferences in Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974) and
Quiggin (1982) lead to the conclusion that precautionary savings rise with risk aversion
(Drèze and Modigliani (1972), Yaari (1987), and Bleichrodt and Eeckhoudt (2005)). On
the contrary, this relation is ambiguous when Epstein and Zin’s (1989) preferences are used
(Kimball and Weil (2009)).1
The current paper makes three contributions. First, it discusses the extent to which the
utility classes mentioned above are well-ordered in terms of risk aversion. In particular, we
show that, when we consider marginal variations in risk, Epstein and Zin preferences are not
well-ordered. Second, we suggest a model-free approach that makes it possible to discuss
the role of risk aversion without focusing on any specific model of rationality. Third, we
apply this setup to establish new general results on the role of risk aversion. In particular,
we show that risk aversion enhances precautionary savings, clarifying the link that exists
between risk aversion and prudence.
Our paper relies on an abstract procedure to define comparative risk aversion, which
assumes no particular structure for the set of consequences. This definition is inspired by
the seminal work of Yaari (1969). In a very natural way, this approach states that if a given
increase in risk is perceived as worthwhile for a decision maker (because it yields a higher
level of ex ante welfare), it should also be so for any less risk-averse decision maker.
A considerable number of papers have used Yaari’s approach to define comparative risk-
(or uncertainty-) aversion. This is explicitly the case in Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974),
Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) and Grant and Quiggin (2005). This is also implicit in
the papers that have focused on certainty equivalents, such as Chew and Epstein (1990)
and Epstein and Zin (1989), as well as in Pratt’s (1964) original definitions based on risk
and probability premia. In most cases, although Grant and Quiggin (2005) is a noteworthy
exception, these papers (implicitly or explicitly) rely on minimalist risk orderings, where
random objects are only compared to deterministic constructs. Our paper departs from this
minimalist approach to provide novel insights. Instead of focusing on certainty equivalents to
assess the individual’s degree of risk aversion, we also account for individual preferences over
marginal variations in risk. Arguably, this is a key requirement for any applicable concept,
since in real life individuals never have the possibility of opting for a completely-deterministic
1More details on the meaning of the preferences à la Kihlstrom and Mirman, Quiggin, and Epstein and
Zin are provided in Section 2.
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life. Moreover this concurs with the general view in Economics that concepts which allow
us to deal with variations “in the small and in the large” are of greater interest than those
which focus exclusively on some particular “large” variations.2
The notion of comparative aversion that we derive when considering marginal risk vari-
ations is stronger than that focusing on certainty equivalents. In consequence, although
preferences may be well ordered in terms of risk aversion when considering certainty equiva-
lents, this may no longer hold when considering the more stringent comparison of marginal
risk variations. This turns out to be the case for Epstein and Zin preferences, which would
therefore appear to be ill-adapted for the analysis of risk aversion. No similar case can be
made against Kihlstrom and Mirman or Quiggin’s anticipated utility functions. These utility
classes actually seem to be well-suited to provide insights into the impact of risk aversion,
even when considering relatively broad definitions for what is meant by an increase in risk.
Abandoning these standard but somewhat restrictive frameworks, we here establish a
general result allowing us to make predictions about the impact of risk aversion without
assuming any particular form of rationality. This result is powerful, as it shows that it is
possible to determine the impact of risk aversion under relatively weak assumptions on ordi-
nal preferences, as long as states of the world can be ranked from bad to good independently
of the agent’s action. The intuition behind this result is that risk aversion enhances the
willingness to redistribute from good to bad states.
We provide a direct application to savings under uncertainty. In particular we prove,
under weak conditions on ordinal preferences, that risk aversion enhances precautionary
savings. Moreover, we show that risk aversion has a negative (resp. positive) impact on
savings when the rate of return is uncertain, as soon as the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution is larger (resp. smaller) than one. Risk aversion is also found to have a negative
impact on savings when the lifetime is uncertain, therefore underlining that the relation
between time preference, risk aversion and mortality risk discussed in Bommier (2006) is
general and is not restricted to the expected-utility framework.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present several classes
of utility functions that have been used to analyze the role of risk aversion in intertemporal
models. The main theoretical contents appear in Section 3, which is split up into several
subsections. Subsection 3.1 introduces the relevant concepts, and Subsection 3.2 then focuses
on the simplest random objects that we can think of: “heads or tails” gambles, which are
lotteries with two equally-probable outcomes. In this case, all of the reasonably conceivable
2The contrast between the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of risk aversion (allowing us to consider small or large
risks) and Aumann and Kurz’s (2005) “Fear of ruin” coefficient (bearing exclusively on bets involving the loss
of all wealth) is another example of the greater applicability of the marginal approach. Foncel and Treich
(2005) discuss this issue.
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definitions of comparative risk aversion coincide, and there is no possible dispute regarding
the generality of the conclusions. This minimalist approach is sufficient to show that Epstein
and Zin preferences are not well-ordered in terms of risk aversion. To increase applicability,
the analysis is extended in Section 3.3 to continuous lotteries. We define a formal notion of
comparative risk aversion and show how it can be used to obtain model-free results on the
impact of risk aversion. A number of applications providing insights into the impact of risk
aversion on savings behavior are then developed in Section 4.
To help the reader to grasp the paper’s main message, we restrict the use of the term
Proposition to the most significant results. The paper also includes other statements, which
are useful for general understanding, or for the relation of our work to that of others, but
which are admittedly less important or original. These are labeled as Result.
2 Popular classes of utility functions disentangling risk
aversion from intertemporal substitution
Before moving on to the core of the paper we describe in this section a number of approaches
that have been suggested in the literature to the analysis of risk aversion in intertempo-
ral frameworks. This discussion is restricted to preferences over “certain× uncertain” con-
sumption pairs as in Selden (1978) and many other papers on precautionary savings. A
“certain× uncertain” consumption pair will be denoted (c1, c˜2), where the tilde emphasizes
that the second element is random.
Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974) convincingly explain that the comparison of agents’ risk
aversions is possible if and only if agents have identical preferences over certain prospects.
We shall therefore focus on utility classes involving different risk attitudes, while leaving
preferences over certain consumption paths unchanged. This rules out the standard class
of expected-utility models assuming additively-separable utility functions. Under additive
separability, it is impossible to change risk preferences, without affecting ordinal preferences.3
We therefore consider three extensions of the standard additively-separable expected-
utility model, where risk aversion can be analyzed without affecting ordinal preferences.
3One extremely popular representation is the following additive expected utility specification:
U(c1, c˜2) =
c1−ρ1
1− ρ + E
[
c˜1−ρ2
1− ρ
]
where the parameter ρ is interpreted as reflecting the agent’s risk aversion. However, changing ρ involves
changing ordinal preferences (in particular, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, which equals 1ρ ) and
cannot be used to analyze the impact of risk aversion. Discussions about this can be found for example in
Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974) and Epstein and Zin (1989).
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This is not of course an exhaustive review of what can be found in the literature, but rather
focuses on the most popular specifications. The first setup, which assumes expected utility,
was suggested by Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974). The second one was introduced by Selden
(1978), building on the framework in Kreps and Porteus (1978), and was then extended by
Epstein and Zin (1989) to deal with infinitely-long consumption streams, and appears to be
a very convenient way of studying many intertemporal problems. This has now become by
far the most popular approach to the analysis of risk aversion in intertemporal frameworks.
The third class, based on Quiggin’s (1982) anticipated-utility theory, is used in Yaari (1987),
Segal, Spivak and Zeira (1988), and Bleichrodt and Eeckhoudt (2005), for example.
The initial contributions of Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974), Selden (1978) and Quiggin
(1982) were very general, and were not limited to the analysis of intertemporal choices.
No assumptions were made about ordinal preferences. However, applied work on savings
often assumes that preferences over certain consumption paths are additively separable. The
(ordinal) utility U(c1, c2) associated with the certain consumption profile (c1, c2) is expressed
as the sum of the utilities associated with the first-period and second-period consumptions.
U(c1, c2) = u1(c1) + u2(c2) (1)
We include this assumption of the additive separability of ordinal preferences in our
definitions of what we call “Kihlstrom and Mirman”, “Selden” or “Quiggin” utility functions.
At this point, it should therefore be clear that our terminology is only indicative of the
general framework in which these particular specifications may be related. However, we do
not aim to provide a complete account of the contributions of the corresponding papers,
which consider both much broader utility classes and more complex settings.
Definition 1 (Utility classes) A utility function U(c1, c˜2) is called:
• A Kihlstrom and Mirman utility function (denoted UKMk ) if there exist continuous
increasing real functions u1, u2 and k such that:
UKMk (c1, c˜2) = k
−1 (E [k (u1(c1) + u2(c˜2))])
• A Selden utility function (denoted USv ) if there exist continuous increasing real functions
u1, u2 and v such that:
USv (c1, c˜2) = u1(c1) + u2
(
v−1 (E[v(c˜2)])
)
• A Quiggin utility function (denoted UQφ ) if there exist continuous real functions u1, u2
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and a continuous increasing function φ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] , with φ(0) = 0 and φ(1) = 1,
such that:
UQφ (c1, c˜2) = u1(c1) + Eφ[u2(c˜2)]
where Eφ[·] denotes the Choquet expectation operator associated with φ. For any real
random variable z˜ characterized by the cumulative distribution function z 7→ F (z), this
operator assigns:
Eφ[z˜] = −
∫ +∞
−∞
z d (φ (1− F (z)))
The Kihlstrom and Mirman, Selden and Quiggin utility functions rank certain consump-
tion pairs (c1, c2) in the same way, respecting the ordering given by the utility function U in
equation (1).
One popular specification results from choosing isoelastic functions in the Selden utility
function. Setting u1(c) = u2(c) = c
1−ρ
1−ρ and v(x) =
x1−γ
1−γ yields a class of utility functions as-
suming a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution and homothetic preferences. Such
utility functions are often called “Epstein and Zin utility functions”, although they indicate
only imperfectly what can be found in Epstein and Zin (1989), who consider preferences
over infinitely-long consumption paths, which is a much more complex issue. Even so, this
terminology has become very popular in the Economic literature, and we think it is more
productive and less confusing to adhere to it, rather than introducing a new one.
Definition 2 A utility function U(c1, c˜2) is called an Epstein and Zin utility function (de-
noted UEZγ ) if there exist positive scalars ρ 6= 1 and γ 6= 1 such that:4
UEZγ (c1, c˜2) =
c1−ρ1
1− ρ +
1
1− ρ
(
E
[
c˜1−γ2
]) 1−ρ
1−γ
Certainty-equivalent arguments have been applied to suggest that these Kihlstrom and
Mirman, Selden, Epstein and Zin, and Quiggin utility functions are well-suited for the anal-
ysis of risk aversion. It can indeed easily be shown that the greater is the concavity of k (for
Kihlstrom and Mirman utility functions), the greater is the concavity of v (for Selden utility
functions), the greater is the scalar γ (for Epstein and Zin utility functions) and the greater
is the convexity of φ (for Quiggin utility functions), the smaller (in terms of ordinal utility)
is the certainty equivalent assigned to any random element (c1, c˜2). In formal terms, for any
certain consumption path (C1, C2) and any “certain× uncertain” consumption pair (c1, c˜2),
then the following hold:
4The extension to the cases where ρ = 1 or γ = 1 could easily be considered, but is ruled out here to
avoid the systematic discussion of these particular cases.
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1. UKMk1 (c1, c˜2) = U
KM
k1
(C1, C2)⇒ UKMk2 (c1, c˜2) ≤ UKMk2 (C1, C2) for all functions k2 which
are more concave than the function k1.5
2. USv1(c1, c˜2) = U
S
v1
(C1, C2) ⇒ USv2(c1, c˜2) ≤ USv2(C1, C2) for all functions v2 which are
more concave than v1.
3. UEZγ1 (c1, c˜2) = U
EZ
γ1
(C1, C2) ⇒ UEZγ2 (c1, c˜2) ≤ UEZγ2 (C1, C2) for all real parameters γ2 >
γ1.
4. UQφ1(c1, c˜2) = U
Q
φ1
(C1, C2) ⇒ UQφ2(c1, c˜2) ≤ U
Q
φ2
(C1, C2) for all functions φ2 which are
more convex than φ1.
Strict inequalities are moreover obtained as soon as c˜2 is a non degenerate random ele-
ment. The fact that one agent systematically has lower certainty equivalents than another
one has often been interpreted as an indication of greater risk aversion. In fact, many pa-
pers, including Pratt (1964), Yaari (1969), Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974), Chew and Epstein
(1990), Epstein and Zin (1989) precisely define the notion of “more risk-averse than” by con-
sidering certainty equivalents. These utility classes are then considered by the authors to
be well-ordered in terms of “risk aversion”, with “risk aversion” related to the concavity (or
convexity) of the functions k, v or φ, or the magnitude of the parameter γ.
The argument that we develop in this paper, in particular in Section 3, is that a more
risk-averse agent must indeed have lower certainty equivalents, but that considerations about
certainty equivalents are not sufficient to yield conclusions regarding comparative risk aver-
sion. We argue that agent A having systematically lower certainty equivalents than agent
B is a necessary condition for A being more risk-averse than B, but not a sufficient one.
Considering a less-restrictive definition of comparative risk aversion implies that some of the
above classes of utility functions may be well ordered in terms of risk aversion, while others
may not be.
We provide two examples to illustrate that relying on different utility classes may yield
different conclusions regarding the impact of risk aversion. A first example comes from
the literature on precautionary savings. In a two-period consumption model, precautionary
saving is the optimal amount of saving when second-period income is uncertain minus savings
when income risk can be fully insured. Previous classes of utility functions in Definition
1 yield contrasting results about the possible impact of risk aversion. For Kihlstrom and
Mirman utility functions, it is straightforward to conclude from Drèze and Modigliani (1972)
(at least for small risks) that precautionary savings increase with the concavity of k as long as
5A function g2 is said to be more concave (resp. convex) than a function g1 if there exists a concave (resp.
convex) function g such that g2(x) = g(g1(x)).
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first-period consumption is a normal good. Risk aversion would then increase precautionary
saving. A similar result is obtained by Bleichrodt and Eeckhoudt (2005) for Quiggin utility
functions. On the contrary, Kimball and Weil (2009) prove in their Proposition 7 that the
amount of precautionary savings is not monotonic in γ, for Epstein and Zin preferences.
This suggests that there is no simple relationship between risk aversion and precautionary
savings.
A second example concerns savings when the rate of return is random. The impact of risk
aversion with Kihlstrom and Mirman preferences is actually one of the applications treated
in their seminal contribution. It is proved that risk aversion increases or decreases optimal
savings when the return on saving is uncertain, according to whether the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is smaller or greater than one. This finding is contradicted by
Langlais (1995), who shows that no such result holds in the Selden framework. Again,
this illustrates that the above classes of utility functions may lead to divergent conclusions
regarding the impact of risk aversion on saving behavior. However, we shall see that for both
problems – savings with uncertain incomes, and savings with uncertain returns – the role
of risk aversion becomes unambiguous and particularly intuitive once a formal and general
sense is given to comparative risk aversion.
3 Theory
3.1 Common features
As noted above, a number of papers, including Pratt (1964), Yaari (1969), Kihlstrom and
Mirman (1974), Epstein and Zin (1989), and Chew and Epstein (1990), have focused on
how agents compare lotteries to certain outcomes in order to quantify and compare risk
aversion. Typically, one agent is said to be more risk-averse than another if the former
systematically associates lower certainty equivalents to random objects than does the latter.
Considering how agents compare random to certain outcomes is one way of measuring the
agent’s willingness to avoid uncertainty. However, we believe that in order to be applicable,
“being more risk-averse” should mean “greater aversion to increases in risk”, and not only a
greater willingness to avoid all uncertainty. In other words, in order to assess risk aversion,
we should not only focus on the agent’s comparison of lotteries to certain outcomes, but also
consider how he compares non-degenerate lotteries that are more or less risky.
In order to proceed in this way, we need a definition of “being riskier than” which is not
a trivial issue. As explained in Chateauneuf, Cohen, and Meilijson (2004), the literature
on monetary lotteries has not reached a consensus on what an increase in risk is. They
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review different notions, which are shown to yield different predictions regarding the role of
risk aversion. One way of overcoming these difficulties is to focus on risk comparisons that
are consensual. If it is difficult to find a convincing universal definition of an increase in
risk, it is possible to restrict the analysis to cases where risk comparison is unambiguous.
Yaari (1969) implicitly proceeds in such a way, with an extremely minimalist definition
of “riskier than” where a lottery l1 is said to be riskier than a lottery l2 if and only if l2
is a degenerate lottery providing a given outcome with certainty. Focusing on certainty
equivalents as in Pratt (1964), Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974), Epstein and Zin (1989), and
Chew and Epstein (1990) is equivalent to using Yaari’s approach, as long as all lotteries have
certainty equivalents.
Our paper takes a similar line, but departs from Yaari’s minimalist approach which fails
to account for many unambiguous risk comparisons. There are indeed many cases where two
non-degenerate lotteries can be unambiguously compared in terms of riskiness. We account
in this paper for some of these cases, which allows us to define a notion of comparative risk
aversion which is stronger than that in Yaari, and which leads to interesting predictions
regarding the impact of risk aversion in many concrete problems.
The interest of our approach is particularly clear when considering the simplest random
objects of “heads or tails” gambles, i.e. lotteries which have only a good and a bad payoff, each
equally likely. In this case, acknowledging that improving the good outcome and reducing
the bad outcome corresponds to an increase in risk is sufficient to provide a unique ordering
in terms of risk aversion. This ordering is stronger than that obtained from Yaari’s approach,
with implications for the relevance of the standard classes of utility functions for analyzing
the role of risk aversion, as explained in Section 3.2.3.
The arguments in the case of continuous lotteries are somewhat more complex, but are
necessary for the derivation of general results. These arguments are presented in Section 3.3.
3.1.1 The setting
This section sets out the common setting for both heads or tails gambles and continuous
lotteries.
State and lottery sets. We consider an abstract space set X endowed with an ordinal
preference relation . Uncertainty is represented by a probability space (Ω,F , P r), where
Ω is the sample space including all states of the world (it is countable in the case of heads or
tails, but not for continuous lotteries), F is the σ−algebra of events, which are subsets of Ω,
and Pr is the associated probability measure. Lotteries are measurable functions from the
sample space Ω to the state space X. We denote by L(X) the set of lotteries with outcomes
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in X. L ∈ L(X) is a random variable, while L(ω) ∈ X with ω ∈ Ω represents the realization
of the lottery when state ω occurs. We denote by δx ∈ L(X) a degenerate lottery, which
pays off x ∈ X with certainty.
Risk preferences. We consider two agents A and B with respective preferences A and
B over a subset Y of L(X). This set Y may be equal to L(X) but for greater generality
we only assume that Y includes the set of degenerate gambles.
{δx|x ∈ X} ⊂ Y ⊂ H(X)
We assume that the risk preferences A and B are consistent with ordinal preferences in
the following sense:
Assumption A (Consistency with ordinal preferences) Preferences over gambles are
consistent with ordinal preferences if:
x  y ⇔ δx i δy for all x, y ∈ X and i = A,B
Agents A and B should therefore rank the degenerate lotteries in exactly the same way as
ordinal preferences rank outcomes. As a result, A and B agree on the ranking of degenerate
lotteries. Without reproducing the discussion in Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974) and Epstein
and Zin (1989), we take for granted that agents are comparable in terms of risk aversion if
and only if they have the same ordinal preferences.
Another natural property when considering risk preferences is ordinal dominance, as
formalized for example in Chew and Epstein (1990). The intuition behind this property is
simple: if one lottery always provides a better outcome than another (whatever the state of
the world), this lottery should be preferred. Formally:
Definition 3 (Ordinal Dominance) Preferences over gambles i (i = A,B) fulfill ordi-
nal dominance when we have for any lotteries L,L′ ∈ Y :
(i) if for all ω ∈ Ω, L(ω)  L′(ω) then L i L′,
(ii) moreover, if there exists ω ∈ Ω such that L(ω)  L′(ω), then L i L′.
According to the definition of ordinal dominance, a first-order stochastically dominated
lottery should not be preferred. Moreover, a first-order stochastically dominating lottery is
strictly preferred if and only if it pays a strictly better outcome in at least one state of the
world.
It can be argued that this is a reasonable requirement for defining rational risk preferences.
However, as some popular preferences (such as Selden and Epstein and Zin preferences) do
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not satisfy this property (see for example the discussion in Chew and Epstein (1990)), we
do not systematically make this assumption, but mention it whenever necessary.
3.1.2 A formal definition of comparative risk aversion
We now make clear the procedure we use to give a sense to risk-aversion comparisons, when
we consider a general set of outcomes. Intuitively, an agent A will be said to be more risk-
averse than an agent B, if any increase in risk that is considered to be desirable by A is
also considered so by B. This procedure is general in the sense that it is valid in both the
heads or tails and continuous lottery setups. However, the definition of an “increase in risk”
is different across these setups, which affects the consequences of being more risk-averse.
Formally speaking, we simply suppose that there exists a binary relation defined over the
lottery set Y , which we denote by R. This relation is interpreted as “riskier than” and more
precisely as “at least as risky as”. For example, for L,L′ ∈ Y , LRL′ means that the lottery
L is (weakly) riskier than L′. The relationship R is supposed to be reflexive and transitive,
thus defining a partial preorder. Using this partial preorder R, we set out our definition of
comparative risk aversion.
Definition 4 (Comparative risk aversion) Let R be a partial preorder “riskier than” de-
fined over the lottery set Y . A is more (weakly) risk-averse than B with respect to R if for
all L,L′ ∈ Y :
LRL′ and L A L′ =⇒ L B L′
This definition states that any riskier lottery, which is preferred by the more risk-averse
agent is also preferred by the less risk-averse agent. This definition has of course to be
completed with a reasonable notion of “riskier than”. By construction the above definition
is weak, in the sense that it is reflexive. Every agent is more risk-averse than himself.
We now specify the sample space Ω and the binary relation R.
3.2 Theory, Part 1: Heads or tails gambles
We give more structure to the above setting when we restrict our attention to heads or tails
gambles. We then consider how standard utility classes are ordered in terms of risk aversion.
3.2.1 The setting
We suppose that the sample space is reduced to heads or tails: Ω = {h, l} and that both
states h and l occur with the same probability of 1
2
. We denote by H(X) the set of heads
or tails gambles with outcomes in X. An element of H(X) denoted (xl;xh) is the lottery
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yielding xl ∈ X with probability 0.5 and xh ∈ X with probability 0.5. For sake of simplicity
and without loss of generality, we suppose that the first outcome is not better than the
second: xh  xl. The element (x;x) is the degenerate gamble which yields x ∈ X with
certainty. To clearly distinguish between these very simple binary lotteries and the more
general lotteries that we will introduce in Section 3.3, we call the simple binary lotteries
gambles, while the more general ones are called lotteries.
We consider two agents A and B with preferences i over gambles in Y that are consistent
with ordinal preferences (Assumption A).
3.2.2 Comparative riskiness
The procedure that compares preferences in terms of risk aversion (Definition 4) presupposes
the existence of a relation R allowing us to compare the riskiness of the gambles. However,
we will see that we do not necessarily need to fully explicit the partial preorder R to derive
non-trivial results. Minimal requirements about R may be sufficient, at least when ordinal
dominance is assumed.
We take advantage of the very basic structure of gambles to discuss what could be
reasonable relations R. Consider two gambles (xl;xh) and (yl; yh) of the set Y , and assume
(without loss of generality) that the outcomes are ordered: xh  xl and yh  yl. The four
possible combinations are then:
Case 1: (xh  yh and xl  yl) or (xh  yh and xl  yl)
Case 2: (yh  xh and yl  xl) or (yh  xh and yl  xl)
Case 3: xh  yh  yl  xl
Case 4: yh  xh  xl  yl
In Case 1, the gamble (xl;xh) strictly first-order dominates (yl; yh). We can think of a
number of different ways of comparing the riskiness of (xl;xh) and (yl; yh). However, unless
we allow for risk preferences that do not satisfy ordinal dominance, the comparison of such
lotteries is not of any interest for comparative risk aversion. We therefore remain agnostic
about risk comparison in this case, and allow that a variety of judgments can be made. Case
2 is symmetric to Case 1.
We now consider Case 3. The lucky outcome of the gamble (xl;xh) is better than that of
(yl; yh), but the unlucky outcome is worse; Case 4 is symmetric. We define below the notion
of spread, which describes these cases:
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Definition 5 (Gamble spread) The gamble (xl;xh) is a spread of (yl; yh), which is de-
noted by (xl;xh) ` (yl; yh), if the following relationship holds:
(xl;xh) ` (yl; yh)⇐⇒ xh  yh  yl  xl
(We suppose that, in each gamble, the outcomes are ordered).
Assume that (xl;xh) is a spread of (yl; yh). Choosing (xl;xh) instead of (yl; yh) involves
taking the chance of being in a better position if the odds are good, but ending up in a worse
situation if the odds are bad. It is then undisputable that (xl;xh) is riskier than (yl; yh).
Note that if the preference relation  is represented by a utility function, (xl;xh) ` (yl; yh)
implies that the distribution of ex-post utilities associated with the gamble (xl;xh) is more
dispersed than that in the gamble (yl; yh) in the strong sense of Bickel and Lehman (1976),
whatever the utility function chosen to represent . The fact that (xl;xh) is considered to
be riskier than (yl; yh) whenever (xl;xh) ` (yl; yh) is therefore particularly robust: it is not
restricted to any particular choice of ex-post utility dispersion, and is independent of the
cardinality.
While there may be disagreement about the relative riskiness of (xl;xh) and (yl; yh) in
Cases 1 and 2, a minimal requirement for any “riskier than” relation R is that it respects the
ranking of the spread relationship `. We additionally impose that if the gamble (xl;xh) is a
spread of (yl; yh) in a strict sense (that is with either xh  yh or yl  xl) then (yl; yh) cannot
be considered to be riskier than (yl; yh). We call this requirement spread compatibility :
Definition 6 (Spread compatibility) A partial-order “riskier than” R is spread compat-
ible if and only if:
(i) (xl;xh) ` (yl; yh)⇒ (xl;xh)R(yl; yh)
(ii) If (xl;xh) ` (yl; yh) and xh  yh or yl  xl then it cannot be the case that (yl; yh)R(xl;xh).
The following result states that spread compatibility and ordinal dominance are sufficient
to define an unambiguous measure of comparative risk aversion, at least for heads or tails
gambles.
Result 1 We consider two agents A and B with preferences satisfying the Definition 3 of
ordinal dominance. If agent A is more risk-averse than agent B with respect to a spread-
compatible partial order R, then he will also be with respect to any other spread compatible
partial order R′.
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Proof. We consider two gambles (xl;xh) and (yl; yh), with (xl;xh)R′(yl; yh) and (xl;xh) A
(yl; yh). We want to prove that (xl;xh) B (yl; yh). Following our previous remarks, there
are at most four possibilities:
1. (xl;xh) strictly first-order dominates (yl; yh). Due to the ordinal-dominance assumption
(Definition 3) (xl;xh) B (yl; yh).
2. (xl;xh) strictly first-order dominates (yl; yh). We can rule out this possibility, because
the ordinal-dominance assumption implies that (yl; yh) A (xl;xh), which contradicts
our initial assumption (xl;xh) A (yl; yh).
3. (xl;xh) ` (yl; yh). This implies that (xl;xh)R(yl; yh), since R is spread compatible. A
is more risk-averse than B relative to R, which means that (xl;xh) B (yl; yh) by the
Definition 4 of comparative risk aversion.
4. (yl; yh) ` (xl;xh). This implies by spread compatibility that (yl; yh)R′(xl;xh). Since
(xl;xh)R
′(yl; yh) also holds, this implies that xl ∼ yl and xh ∼ yh (part (ii) of the
definition of spread compatibility), and thus (xl;xh) B (yl; yh) from the ordinal-
dominance property .
As soon as we assume ordinal dominance, it is not necessary to fully explicit the relation R
in order to obtain a universal sense for being “more risk-averse than”. The agreement over the
statement that a spread involves an increase in risk is sufficient to define uniquely the notion
of comparative risk aversion. We examine below whether the utility classes mentioned in
Section 2 are well-ordered with respect to this comparative risk aversion relation. When they
do not satisfy ordinal dominance, we consider whether they are well-ordered with respect to
some spread-compatible relation R.
3.2.3 Application to standard classes of preferences over certain×uncertain
consumption pairs
We specify our setting to ensure compatibility with the utility classes defined in Section 2.
The set of outcomes X is the set of admissible two-period consumption profiles. A typical
element of X is (c1, c2), where c1 is first-period and c2 second-period consumption.
We restrict our attention to binary gambles, where first-period consumption is certain.
The sole source of uncertainty concerns second-period consumption, which may be either
low (state l) or high (state h). The set of such binary gambles, with certain first-period
consumption, will be denoted Y . An element of Y is denoted (c1, (cl2, ch2)), where c1 is certain
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first-period consumption, while (cl2, ch2) is the binary gamble over second-period consumption.
Second-period consumption is low at cl2 and high at ch2 , both with probability
1
2
.
The preferences associated with Kihlstrom and Mirman, and Quiggin anticipated utility
functions satisfy ordinal dominance. From Result 1, every spread-compatible relation R
therefore yields identical conclusions about comparative risk aversion within these utility
classes. The following result characterizes the comparative risk aversion ordering in both
frameworks.
Result 2 (Standard utility classes and risk aversion) The following characterization
holds:
1. An agent with utility function UKMkA is more risk-averse than an agent with utility
function UKMkB with respect to any spread-compatible relation R if and only if kA is
more concave than kB.
2. An agent with utility function UQ
φA
is more risk-averse than agent with utility function
UQ
φB
with respect to any spread-compatible relation R if and only if φA(1
2
) ≤ φB(1
2
).
Proof. See the Appendix.
The above result states that both Kihlstrom and Mirman and Quiggin preferences are
well-ordered in terms of risk aversion. However, such a simple characterization does not hold
for Epstein and Zin utility classes. On the contrary, we prove the following negative result:
Proposition 1 (Epstein and Zin utility functions and risk aversion) We consider
two agents A and B with utility functions of UEZγA and U
EZ
γB
respectively, with γA 6= γB. There
does not exist a spread-compatible relation R, such that A is more risk-averse than B with
respect to R.
Proof. Assume that γA > γB and consider a spread-compatible relation R. We show that
A is not more risk-averse than B, nor is B more risk-averse than A.
Proof that A is not more risk-averse than B.
We construct two heads or tails gambles Ga and Gb, with Ga being a spread of Gb
(and thus GaRGb for every spread-compatible relation R), such that agent A is indifferent
between both gambles, and agent B strictly prefers Gb, which is incompatible with A being
more risk-averse than B.
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With 0 < ε << 1, ca, cb > 0, Ga and Gb are defined as follows:
Ga =
(
ca,
(
3
1
1−ρ (1− ε), 3 11−ρ (1 + ε)
))
Gb = (cb, (1− 2ε, 1 + 2ε))
where:6
c1−ρa − c1−ρb =
[
(1− 2ε)1− γA + (1 + 2ε)1−γA
2
] 1−ρ
1−γA − 3
[
(1− ε)1−γA + (1 + ε)1−γA
2
] 1−ρ
1−γA
(2)
1. Agent A is indifferent between Ga and Gb. UEZγB (G
a) = UEZγB (G
b) is equivalent to:
c1−ρa
1− ρ+
3
1− ρ
[
(1− ε)1−γA + (1 + ε)1−γA
2
] 1−ρ
1−γA
=
c1−ρb
1− ρ+
1
1− ρ
[
1
2
(1− 2ε)1−γA + 1
2
(1 + 2ε)1−γA
] 1−ρ
1−γA
(3)
This equality holds from the construction of ca and cb in (2).
2. The gamble Ga is a spread of Gb, Ga ` Gb, if:
c1−ρa
1− ρ+
3
1− ρ(1− ε)
1−ρ <
c1−ρb
1− ρ +
1
1− ρ(1− 2ε)
1−ρ (4)
<
c1−ρb
1− ρ +
1
1− ρ(1 + 2ε)
1−ρ <
c1−ρa
1− ρ +
3
1− ρ(1 + ε)
1−ρ
Using Taylor expansions to express c1−ρa − c1−ρb , we show in the following that the
inequality (4) holds when 0 < ε << 1. First:
[
(1− ε)1−γA + (1 + ε)1−γA
2
] 1−ρ
1−γA
=
[
1− γA(1− γA)
2
ε2 +O(ε3)
] 1−ρ
1−γA
= 1−γA(1− ρ)
2
ε2+O(ε3)
(5)
where O(ε3) denotes a function such that O(ε
3)
ε3
is bounded as ε tends to zero.
Similarly, substituting 2ε for ε in (5) yields the following equation:
[
(1− 2ε)1−γA + (1 + 2ε)1−γA
2
] 1−ρ
1−γA
= 1− 2γA(1− ρ)ε2 +O(ε3) (6)
6It is always possible to find a pair of first-period consumptions (ca, cb) that satisfy this equality, whatever
the value of ρ, since the range of x1−ρ − y1−ρ is R, when x and y cover R+.
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Using both of the above first-order approximations, we simplify equality (2):
c1−ρa
1− ρ −
c1−ρb
1− ρ = −
2
1− ρ −
γA
2
ε2 +O(ε3) (7)
In addition, both of the following approximations hold:
3
1− ρ(1− ε)
1−ρ − 1
1− ρ(1− 2ε)
1−ρ =
2
1− ρ − ε+O(ε
2)
3
1− ρ(1 + ε)
1−ρ − 1
1− ρ(1 + 2ε)
1−ρ =
2
1− ρ + ε+O(ε
2)
Combining these equations, we obtain that condition (4) holds when ε is positive and
small enough. Ga is then a spread of Gb. This implies that GaRGb since R is spread
compatible.
3. Agent B prefers Gb to Ga. We have:
UEZγB (G
b)− UEZγB (Ga) =
c1−ρb
1− ρ −
c1−ρa
1− ρ
+
1
1− ρ
[
(1− 2ε)1−γB + (1 + 2ε)1−γB
2
] 1−ρ
1−γB − 3
1− ρ
[
(1− ε)1−γB + (1 + ε)1−γB
2
] 1−ρ
1−γB
Using approximations (7), as well as (5) and (6), where γA is replaced by γB, we obtain:
UEZγB (G
b)− UEZγB (Ga) =
2
1− ρ +
1
2
γAε
2 − 2
1− ρ −
1
2
γBε
2 +O(ε3)
=
1
2
(γA − γB)ε2 +O(ε3)
which is positive when γA > γB and for ε > 0 small enough.
Thus B strictly prefers Gb to Ga. In the case where A is more risk-averse than B, B
should prefer Ga to Gb. This proves that A cannot be more risk-averse than B.
Proof that B is not more risk-averse than A.
We consider two heads or tails gambles Ha and Hb, with c > 0 and 0 < ε << 1:
Ha =
(
c,
(
(1− ε) 11−γB , (1 + ε) 11−γB
))
Hb = (c, (1, 1))
Note that Hb is a degenerate gamble that produces the certain consumption profile (c, 1)
with certainty.
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1. Agent B is indifferent between both gambles, since the following equality holds:
UEZγB (H
a) =
c1−ρ
1− ρ +
1
1− ρ = U
EZ
γB
(Hb)
2. It is obvious that the gamble Ha is a spread of Hb. Thus HaRHb since R is spread
compatible.
3. Agent A strictly prefers Hb to Ha, since we have:
UEZγA (H
a)− UEZγA (Hb) =
1
1− ρ
(1− ε) 1−γA1−γB + (1 + ε) 1−γA1−γB
2

1−ρ
1−γA
− 1
1− ρ
=
1
1− ρ
[
1 +
1
2
1− γA
1− γB
γB − γA
1− γB
ε2 +O(ε3)
] 1−ρ
1−γA − 1
1− ρ
=
1
2
γB − γA
(1− γB)2
ε2 +O(ε3)
< 0 since γA > γB
As a conclusion, B cannot be more risk-averse than A with respect to R.
This latter proposition emphasizes that, unless we deny that a spread in a simple heads
or tails gamble is an increase in risk, Epstein and Zin utility functions cannot be considered
as appropriate tools for exploring the role of risk aversion. Changing the parameter γ in
Epstein and Zin utility functions does involve changing cardinal preferences while holding
ordinal preferences constant, but there is no direct relation between risk aversion and the γ
parameter. An agent with a higher value of γ will exhibit greater aversion to some particular
increases in risk (the second example in the proof), but also reduced aversion for some other
kinds of increases in risk (the first example in the proof). Interpreting the results obtained
from changes in the value of γ as reflecting the impact of risk aversion is therefore misleading.
Since Epstein and Zin utility functions are a particular case of Selden utility functions,
Proposition 1 a fortiori implies that considerations about the concavity of the function v in
Selden utility functions has no direct interpretation in terms of risk aversion.
The reason for which Epstein and Zin utility functions are not well ordered in terms of
risk aversion is fairly intuitive. Rewrite the Epstein and Zin utility function as:
UEZγ (c1, c˜2) =
c1−ρ1
1− ρ +
E[c˜2]1−ρ
1− ρ
(
E
[(
c˜2
E[c˜2]
)1−γ]) 1−ρ1−γ
It is clear that a greater value of γ means greater relative risk aversion with respect
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to second-period consumption. But, there is no monotonic relation between relative risk
over second-period consumption and aggregate risk over lifetime utility – with the latter
being what matters for comparative risk aversion. A gamble may imply greater relative risk
over second-period consumption than another, but at the same time less absolute risk over
lifetime utility. This is actually the case when we compare the gambles Gb and Ga defined
above. Even if the “relative” risk expressed as a share of average second-period consumption
is larger in Gb than in Ga, the (absolute) risk embedded in Ga is greater than that in Gb.
Agent B with γB < γA prefers lottery Gb with the greatest second-period “relative risk”
while were he to be less risk-averse he should prefer lottery Ga with less aggregate risk.
3.3 Theory, Part 2: Continuous distributions
We have so far focused on heads or tails gambles, which simplify the discussion of comparative
risk aversion for two reasons. First, when considering two gambles, there are only two
possibilities: either one first-order dominates the other, or one is a spread of the other.
Second, in the case of gambles, the notion of spread coincides with all arguably reasonable
notions of dispersion, so that there is no possible dispute of the fact that a spread is an
increase in risk.
In the remainder of the paper, we consider the general case of continuous lotteries. The
cost for this increase in generality is that there are now many possible definitions of greater
risk, implying different meanings for being “more risk-averse than”. We argue that this dif-
ficulty should be acknowledged, rather than ignored. Different definitions of what is an
increase in risk provide different notions of comparative risk aversion. The more restric-
tive the relation over risk comparison, the less stringent the associated notion of preference
comparisons. In particular, restricting risk comparisons to very particular cases (as when
considering only comparisons with certain outcomes) yields a very weak notion of compara-
tive risk aversion, with little applicability for applied topics. However, as we will see, there is
no need to rely on fancy risk comparisons to obtain results of interest. In particular, we will
show that the consideration of simple spreads (which are just a generalization of the spread
relation introduced above for heads or tails gambles) allows us to derive a general model-free
result that makes it possible to derive unambiguous conclusions regarding the impact of risk
aversion in a wide variety of settings.
3.3.1 The setting
The setting is very similar to that initially described in Section 3.1.1, the only difference
being that we no longer restrict the sample space Ω, which is a priori uncountable, nor the
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probability Pr. The set X is endowed with a preference relation , and L(X) is the set of
lotteries, defined over Ω and paying off in X.
For simplicity’s sake, we suppose that the ordinal preference relationship  over X can
be represented by a function U : X → R. We shall however insist on the fact that the results
we derive do not depend on a particular utility representation. Any utility representation of
, based on a different utility function would yield the same conclusions. The cumulative
distribution function for a lottery L ∈ L(X) is denoted FL and defined over R. For any real
number u, FL(u) is simply the probability (Pr defined over the probability space) that the
utility of the lottery realization (whose value is in X) is smaller than a given u:
∀u ∈ R, FL(u) = Pr{U(L(ω)) ≤ u|ω ∈ Ω}
A lottery L will be said to first-order dominate a lottery L′ if and only if FL(u) ≤ FL′(u)
for all u, and to strictly first-order dominate L′, if there additionally exists v such that
FL(v) < FL′(v). It is clear that this notion of dominance is independent of the utility
function that is chosen to represent the preference relation .
The preferences of agents A and B i (i = A,B) over a subset Y ⊂ L(X) of lotteries are
compatible with ordinal preferences (Assumption A) and ordinal dominance (Property 3).
3.3.2 Comparative riskiness
In order to apply the general procedure for comparing risk aversion (Definition 4), we need
a notion of “riskier than” that is valid for continuous lotteries. We generalize the notion of
spread introduced in Definition 5 as follows:
Definition 7 (p−Spread) Given a scalar p ∈]0, 1[. A lottery L is a said to be a p−spread
of the lottery L′ that we denote by L `p L′, if there exists an u0 ∈ R such that:
1. FL(u0) = p
2. for all u ≤ u0, FL(u) ≥ FL′(u),
3. for all u ≥ u0, FL(u) ≤ FL′(u).
This definition is equivalent to stating that FL single-crosses FL′ , with the crossing oc-
curring at the y-value of p. In Figure 1 (p. 21), lottery L is a p−spread of lottery L′.
It is worth noting that the above definition does not depend on the choice of the rep-
resentation U of preferences, but only on ordinal preferences.7 If a lottery L is a utility
7This would not be the case for other notions of dispersion, such as that suggested by Bickel and Lehman
(1976), or for mean-preserving spreads, second-order stochastic dominance, etc.
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Figure 1: p−spread L `p L′
spread of another lottery L′ for a given utility representation U , then it will also be so for
any representation corresponding to the same ordinal preferences. The p−spread property
is therefore an ordinal and not a cardinal concept.
We can then easily check that the p−spread relation is reflexive and transitive, and thus
defines a partial preorder on Y . We also argue that if a lottery L is a p−spread of the lottery
L′, then L is riskier than L′. Comparing L to L′, states of the world can be split up into “bad
states” with measure p, and “good states” with measure 1 − p, such that: (i) the outcome
of L or L′ obtained in any good state of the world is preferable to that which is obtained
in bad states of the world; (ii) conditional on the state being good, the lottery L first-order
dominates the lottery L′, while the reverse holds when states are bad. The lotteries L and
L′ can be seen as the result of binary gambles (determining whether the state of the world
is bad, with probability p, or good, with probability 1 − p) with the good outcome of L
dominating the good outcome of L′, and the bad outcome of L being dominated by the bad
outcome of L′. In this sense, it seems clear that L is riskier than L′, since it pays off more
in good states and less in bad states.
It is possible to define a notion of spread as L ` L′ if and only if L `p L′ for some p ∈]0, 1[.
A number of papers, such as Jewitt (1987) and Johnson and Myatt (2006), have used such
spreads or single-crossing properties as a criterion of greater dispersion. One particularity
of single crossing is that it is not transitive and thus does not define a risk order. Taking
the transitive closure of this single-crossing property is not a good option either, since the
succession of two single crossings may yield something infinitely closed to an increase in risk.
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Formally, we can have L ` L′ ` L′′ and L′′ very close to a lottery M such that M ` L.
As it may seem unappealing to have a notion of “riskier than”, which is not transitive, we
introduce the notion of a p−spread. However, the results relying on assumptions valid for
all p, can equivalently be expressed using the spread relation `.
When considering preferences over certain× uncertain consumption pairs, and the stan-
dard utility classes mentioned in Definition 1, both the Kihlstrom and Mirman and Quiggin
utility functions can easily be ordered in terms of aversion for p−spread increases in risk.
Result 3 (Comparative risk aversion and standard utility classes) The following re-
sults hold for standard utility classes:
• An agent with a utility function UKMkA is more risk-averse than an agent with a utility
function UKMkB with respect to all p−spread relations if and only if kA is more concave
than kB.
• An agent with a utility function UQ
φA
is more risk-averse than an agent with a utility
function UQ
φB
with respect to all p−spread relations if and only if φA is more convex
than φB.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This result extends the characterization of comparative risk aversion obtained in Result 2.
Regarding the Epstein and Zin class, we already know from Proposition 1 that Epstein
and Zin utility functions are not properly ranked with respect to aversion for 1/2−spread
increases in risk, so that there is no chance of reaching a conclusion similar to those of
Result 3. Furthermore, we can easily slightly modify the proof of Proposition 1 to show
that for any two different Epstein and Zin utility functions UEZγA and U
EZ
γB with γA 6= γB and
any p ∈]0, 1[, it cannot be the case that UEZγA is more risk-averse than UEZγB with respect to
p−spread increases in risk.
3.3.3 A model-free result
Having provided a formal meaning of comparative risk aversion, we are now interested in
deriving results for the impact of risk aversion on agents’ behaviors. We suppose that agents
may chose an action t ∈ I ⊂ R, which modifies the payoff of a lottery. Such a lottery
is noted Lt ∈ Y and its realization when state ω ∈ Ω occurs is Lt(ω) ∈ X. With minimal
assumptions, which are detailed below, we prove a very general result stating that the optimal
action under uncertainty covaries monotonically with risk aversion.
Our first assumption is that the action t has a true effect on lotteries.
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Assumption B (Non-Constant) Consider two actions t1 ∈ I and t2 ∈ I. If Lt1(ω) ∼
Lt2(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω, then t1 = t2.
The above assumption is obviously a necessary condition for our model-free result. In
the extreme case, when t does not have any influence on the lottery Lt, we would obviously
be silent about the impact of the risk aversion on the choice of the action.
Second, we make an assumption of single peakedness. For each ω ∈ Ω, the application
t 7→ Lt(ω) is supposed to be single-peaked, which implies that in a given state of the world
ω: (i) there exists a best action tω and (ii) an action is all the more preferred the closer it is
to tω.
Assumption C (Single-Peakedness) For all ω ∈ Ω:
∃tω ∈ Ω such that ∀t ∈ I, Ltω(ω)  Lt(ω)
t1 ≤ t2 ≤ tω ≤ t3 ≤ t4 (∈ I), ⇒
{
Ltω(ω)  Lt2(ω)  Lt1(ω)
Ltω(ω)  Lt3(ω)  Lt4(ω)
Third, we assume that actions do not modify the initial order of the lottery outcomes.
Whatever the action chosen by the agent, the ranking of lottery payoffs remain unaffected.
In other words, for any pair of actions t and t′, the lotteries Lt and Lt′ are comonotonic.
Assumption D (Comonotonicity) Consider two states ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω. Lottery outcomes
satisfy the following:
(Lt(ω1)  Lt(ω2) for some t ∈ I)⇒ (Lt′(ω1)  Lt′(ω2) for all t′ ∈ I)
When Assumption D holds, the states of the world may be ranked from good to bad,
independently of agents’ actions. This assumption holds whenever it is possible to tell what
constitutes good news, without knowing agents’ actions. This is for example the case when
considering random income, random returns, provided that we assume that agents’ well-
being increases with wealth. This assumption may not however hold in other circumstances,
for example when action t involves betting on a particular horse, since in this case the action
determines which outcome is preferred. When comonotonicity holds, we will write ω1 ≥ ω2
if Lt(ω1)  Lt(ω2) for all t ∈ I.
The last assumption we make for practical purposes is that the sequence of optimal
actions (tω)ω∈Ω is ordered according to the states of the world ω. The better the state of the
world ω, the greater is the optimal action tω.
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Assumption E (Action Order) For any two states ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω.
ω1 ≥ ω2 =⇒ tω1 ≥ tω2
This last assumption is simply technical. Up to a modification of the action, this as-
sumption always holds. It is always possible to define a bijection ψ : I → I such that ψ(t)
is well-ordered. Without loss of generality, we assume that the better the state of the world,
the greater the optimal action contingent on that state.
It is now possible to formalize a general result about the role of risk aversion:
Proposition 2 (A general model-free result) Consider two agents A and B who have
to choose an action t providing them with a lottery satisfying assumptions B, C, D, and E.
We assume in addition that the preferences of agents A and B satisfy ordinal dominance
(Property 3) and define the respective single optimal actions tA and tB. We then have the
following implication:
If agent A is more risk-averse than agent B with respect to any p−spread relation then
tA ≤ tB.
Proof. We assume that tA > tB. In order to obtain a contradiction, we prove that lottery
LtA is a p−spread of LtB for some p ∈]0; 1[. In this case we have that LtA A LtB and
LtA `p LtB , which would imply that LtA B LtB because A is more risk-averse than B,
contradicting the optimality of tB for agent B.
Proving that lottery LtA is a p−spread of LtB involves showing that there exists u0 ∈ R
and p ∈]0; 1[, such that FL
tA
(u0) = FL
tB
(u0) = p, FL
tA
(u) ≥ FL
tB
(u) for u ≤ u0 and
FL
tA
(u) ≤ FL
tB
(u) for u ≥ u0.
We define ξ− as the subset of R, where the cumulative distribution of LtB is larger than
that of LtA . Conversely, ξ+ is the subset, where the cumulative distribution of LtA is larger
than that of LtB .
ξ− =
{
u ∈ R, FL
tB
(u) ≥ FL
tA
(u)
}
and ξ+ =
{
u ∈ R, FL
tA
(u) ≥ FL
tB
(u)
}
First, note that each u ∈ R belongs either to ξ+ or ξ−: ξ+∪ ξ− = R. We then distinguish
four cases, depending on whether the sets ξ+ and ξ− are included in each other or not.
1. Suppose that ξ+ = ξ− = R. This means that for all u ∈ R, FL
tA
(u) = FL
tB
(u), which
implies that lotteries pay off the same outcomes in all states of the world. Assumption
B implies that tA = tB, which contradicts the assumption that tB < tA.
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2. Suppose that ξ+ ( ξ− (this means that ξ+ is either empty or contains only elements
u such that FL
tA
(u) = FL
tB
(u)). The c.d.f. of lottery LtB is always larger than that of
LtA , and is strictly larger at least once: LtA strictly first-order dominates the lottery
LtB . Since preferences satisfy ordinal dominance (Property 3), agent B strictly prefers
LtA to LtB , which contradicts the optimality of tB.
3. Suppose that ξ− ( ξ+. Analogously to the case above, this contradicts the optimality
of tA for agent A.
4. We now necessarily have that ξ− 6⊂ ξ+ and ξ+ 6⊂ ξ−. There exists at least one element
in each set, not belonging to the other one, which we denote u+ ∈ ξ+ (and u+ /∈ ξ−)
and u− ∈ ξ− (and u− /∈ ξ+).
We first focus on u−. By definition, 1 − FL
tB
(u−) < 1 − FL
tA
(u−), or equivalently
{ω ∈ Ω|U(LtB(ω)) ≥ u−} ( {ω ∈ Ω|U(LtA(ω)) ≥ u−}. There exists ω1 ∈ Ω in the
second set but not in the first: U(LtB(ω1)) ≤ u− ≤ U(LtA(ω1)). Single-peakedness
(Assumption C) implies that there exists tω1 such that: tω1 ≥ tA ≥ tB.
We consider u ≥ u− and would like to show that {ω ∈ Ω|U(LtB(ω)) ≥ u} ⊂ {ω ∈
Ω|U(LtA(ω)) ≥ u}. Let ωu ∈ {ω ∈ Ω|U(LtB(ω)) ≥ u}. Since U(LtB(ωu)) ≥ u ≥ u− ≥
U(LtB(ω1)), we deduce, from Assumption D of comonotonicity, that ωu ≥ ω1. From
Assumption E, we deduce that tωu ≥ tω1 ≥ tA > tB. Single-peakedness allows us to
conclude that U(LtA(ωu)) ≥ U(LtB(ωu)) ≥ u and ωu ∈ {ω ∈ Ω|U(LtA(ω)) ≥ u}.
We have therefore proved that [u−,+∞[⊂ ξ−. We can show analogously that ] −
∞, u+] ⊂ ξ+. u+ (resp. u−) is a lower (resp. upper) bound for ξ− (resp. ξ+) (otherwise
we can show that u+ ∈ ξ−, which is contradictory). We thus define u = inf ξ− and
u = sup ξ+, which satisfy u ≤ u (otherwise ξ+ ∪ ξ− 6= R). We define u0 as an
element of the non-empty segment [u;u] and p = FL
tB
(u0) = FL
tA
(u0). The cumulative
distribution functions satisfy:
∀u ≤ u0, FL
tB
(u) ≤ FL
tA
(u)
∀u ≥ u0, FL
tB
(u) ≥ FL
tA
(u)
According to Definition 7, this therefore shows that lottery LtA is a utility spread of
LtB , which terminates the proof.
This model-free result shows that, under some mild assumptions, the more risk-averse
is the agent, the smaller is his optimal action. We can summarize the intuition as follows.
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Consider the optimal action tB. We can group the states of the worlds into two subsets. The
first consists of the optimal actions tω, which are smaller than tB, while the second consists
of the optimal actions that are larger than tB. Since, without uncertainty, optimal actions
are assumed to be larger when the state of the world is better, we can qualify the former as
“bad” states of the world and the latter as “good” states. Due to single-peakedness, choosing
an action t smaller than tB involves increasing the agent’s welfare in bad states and reducing
it in good states. Opting for a smaller action is thus one way of redistributing welfare from
good to bad states, and a way of reducing risk regarding agent welfare, which strategy is
preferred by more risk-averse agents.
4 Applications
We use the results from Proposition 2 to analyze in a very simple two-period framework
the savings behavior of an agent facing uncertainty. We consider in turns three types of
uncertainty: (i) second-period income is random; (ii) the savings interest rate is uncertain;
and (iii) the agent faces a mortality risk, i.e. a risk of dying at the end of the first period.
4.1 Application to precautionary savings
We consider the case of agents who live for two periods, have random second-period incomes,
and have to decide how much to save. This very simple problem has been the object of
number of inspirational contributions, including Leland (1968), Sandmo (1970), Drèze and
Modigliani (1972), Caperaa and Eeckhoudt (1975), Kimball (1990), and Kimball and Weil
(2009). These led to the development of the notion of prudence, whose link to risk aversion
has not been clarified despite some impressive efforts (Kimball and Weil, (2009)). We will
see, however, that our general approach does lead to clear and simple conclusions.
To apply our general result, we specify the setting as in Section 3.2.3. The set X is R+2.
A typical element of X is (c1, c2), where c1 is first-period and c2 second-period consumption.
This set X is endowed with an ordinal preference relationship  represented by a utility
function u. The set of lotteries with outcomes in X is denoted H(X), and Y ⊂ H(X) is the
set of lotteries with deterministic first-period consumption. We consider two agents A and
B with preferences i (i = A,B) defined over Y . We assume that these preferences satisfy
the consistency assumption and ordinal dominance.
We now introduce two assumptions regarding ordinal preferences.
Assumption F (Convexity of ordinal preferences) For all (c1, c2), (c′1, c′2), and (c′′1, c′′2)
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in X, and all λ ∈ [0, 1]:
(c′1, c
′
2)  (c1, c2) and (c′′1, c′′2)  (c1, c2) =⇒ (λc′1 + (1− λ)c′′1, λc′2 + (1− λ)c′′2)  (c1, c2)
Assumption G (Normality of first-period consumption) Consider the agent’s opti-
mization problem maxc1,c2 u(c1, c2) subject to the budget constraint c1 +
1
(1+R)
c2 = Y , where
Y ≥ 0 is the discounted total certain income and R > −1 the gross certain interest rate.
The ordinal preference relationship  is such that this problem has a unique solution de-
noted (c1(Y,R), c2(Y,R)), where, additionally, first-period consumption c1(Y,R) increases
with total income Y .
The assumption of preference convexity is fairly standard in the analysis of consumer
behavior.8 This implies Assumption C of single-peakedness which is required for our model-
free result.9 Assumption G of good normality is also very standard. In cases where the
preference relation  can be represented by a differentiable utility function u(c1, c2) over
first-period c1 and second-period c2 consumptions, this assumption concerns the derivative
of the marginal rate of substitution between consumption in both periods relative to second-
period consumption (namely ∂
∂c2
(
∂u
∂c1
∂u
∂c2
)
> 0). However, we believe that greater insight is
gained by emphasizing that the requirement is good normality.
We can now express our finding with respect to precautionary savings:
Proposition 3 (Precautionary savings) Consider two agents A and B, who choose first-
period consumption c1 providing them with a certain× uncertain income profile denoted
(c1, y˜2 + (1 +R)(y1 − c1)), where y1 > 0 is certain first-period income, y˜2 random second-
period income, and R > −1 the certain interest rate. If:
1. The ordinal preference relationship  satisfies Assumptions F and G.
2. Risk preferences A and B satisfy the ordinal dominance Property 3 and define op-
timal first-period consumption levels of cA1 and cB1 .
Then, the following holds:
Agent A is more risk-averse than agent B =⇒ cA1 ≤ cB1
Proof. This proposition comes via an application of the model-free result formulated in
Proposition 2. We simply need to check that the required assumptions hold in this setting.
8See for example the discussion in Mas Colell, Whinston and Green (1995), page 44.
9This is formally shown below, in the proof of Proposition 3. In fact, single-peakedness and convexity are
equivalent if we restrict ourselves to the case of continuous preferences.
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• The action chosen by the agent is the first-period consumption c1.
• Assumptions B and D hold by construction.
• The normality of first-period consumption (Assumption G) ensures that Assumption
E regarding optimal-action ordering holds. Indeed, by definition, the better the state
of the world (i.e., the larger is second-period income y˜2(ω)), the greater is optimal
first-period consumption.
• The convexity of the relation  implies the single peakedness of preferences. Let s? be
the solution of
max
s
u (y1 − s, y2 + (1 +R)s)
and consider, for example, s′ < s′′ < s?. By the definition of s?, we have first that
(y1 − s?, y2 + (1 +R)s?)  (y1 − s′, y2 + (1 +R)s′) and also (y1 − s′, y2 + (1 +R)s′) 
(y1 − s′, y2 + (1 +R)s′). Convexity then implies that for all λ ∈ [0, 1] we can deduce
(y1 − (λ s? + (1− λ) s′), y2 + (1 +R)(λ s? + (1− λ) s′))  (y1 − s′, y2 + (1 +R)s′). As
s′ < s′′ < s?, we can choose λ ∈ [0, 1], such that s′′ = λ s? + (1 − λ) s′, which proves
single-peakedness.
This proposition makes it clear that the greater is risk aversion, the more the agent
saves. The intuition behind this result is very simple. Take an agent who decides to save
s(y˜2) anticipating a random second-period income of y˜2. For simplicity, we assume that this
random income can take two values, y2 and y2. The amount s(y˜2) is an intermediate value
between what he would have saved knowing that he would receive y2 and what he would
have saved knowing that he would earn y2.
s(y2) < s(y˜2) < s (y2)
By saving more than s(y˜2) he increases his welfare in the bad state of the world, but reduces
it in the good state. As this reduces the degree of risk regarding his welfare, it will therefore
be preferred by more risk-averse agents.
Precautionary savings, which are usually defined as the difference between savings with an
uninsurable uncertain second-period income and savings in a full-insurance context, therefore
rise with risk aversion. While our results say nothing about the sign of any precautionary
savings (which may be negative), they do establish that precautionary savings rise with risk
aversion.
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4.2 Application to optimal savings with interest-rate uncertainty
We now raise the question of the relationship between optimal savings and risk aversion, not
in the face of income uncertainty, but rather interest-rate uncertainty. This question was
addressed by Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974) in the expected-utility framework, and Langlais
(1995) for Selden utility functions, with diverging conclusions.
The formal setting of this question (the structure of X, etc.) is exactly the same as in
the previous section. However, the ordinal properties that are required to obtain results
regarding risk aversion are different.
In a deterministic setting, increasing the interest rate is equivalent to changing the price
of second-period consumption. As with any price change, a movement in the interest rate
implies both income and substitution effects. A higher interest rate means a lower price
for second-period consumption, with a positive income effect yielding higher first-period
consumption and lower savings. The opposing substitution effect reduces first-period con-
sumption, and therefore increases savings. The income and substitution effects thus have
opposing effects on optimal savings, and the overall effect may be either positive or negative.
If the income effect dominates, higher interest rates yield lower savings; on the other hand,
if the substitution effect dominates, higher interest rates imply greater savings. For the sake
of clarity, we define the optimal savings function s(y1, y2, R).
s(y1, y2, R) = arg max
s
(y1 − s, y2 + (1 +R)s)
This function may either rise or fall with respect to R, depending on ordinal preferences.
This sign is key for the determination of the effect of risk aversion on savings when interest
rates are non-deterministic.
Proposition 4 Consider two agents A and B, who choose first-period consumption c1 pro-
viding them with a certain× uncertain income profile
(
c1, y2 + (1 + R˜)(y1 − c1)
)
, where y1 >
0 (y2 > 0) is certain first- (second-) period income, and R˜ is the random interest rate. If:
1. The ordinal preference relationship  satisfies Assumption F.
2. Risk preferences A and B satisfy the ordinal dominance Property 3 and define op-
timal first-period consumptions cA1 and cB1 .
Then, the following holds:
Agent A is more risk-averse than agent B =⇒

cA1 ≤ cB1 if R 7→ s(y1, y2, R) is decreasing
or
cB1 ≤ cA1 if R 7→ s(y1, y2, R) is increasing
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Proof. The proof is straightforward and is very similar to that in Proposition 3. When the
substitution effect dominates, in order to use the result of Proposition 2 directly, we may
consider that the action is not c1, but rather s = y1 − c1.
If preferences can be represented by a twice continuously-differentiable utility function,
the derivative ∂s
∂R
is positive (negative) if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is greater
(less) than one (Kihlstrom and Mirman, (1974)). The preceding proposition could then be
expressed by refering to the value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, although
this would be slightly less general (as differentiability would then be required).
Our findings extend those in Kihlstrom and Mirman, which were restricted to the expected-
utility framework, with differentiable utility functions. They contradict those in Langlais
(1995), who considers Selden utility functions, the explanation being that these latter func-
tions are not well-ordered in terms of risk aversion.
4.3 Application to optimal savings with lifetime uncertainty
In our last application, we consider the effect of an uncertain lifetime on optimal savings.
The traditional view in Economics is that risk aversion and time preference are orthogonal
aspects of preferences. However, Bommier (2006) and (2008) has underlined that as soon as
we take lifetime uncertainty into account, there is a strong direct relationship between risk
aversion and time discounting, with significant implications for savings behavior. Bommier’s
results were however derived in an expected-utility framework, omitting some aspects of
preferences such as bequests. We here show how the impact of risk aversion on savings with
lifetime uncertainty can be addressed without assuming expected utility and allowing for
bequests.
We consider an agent who has an initial endowment W and who may live for one or
two time periods. This agent chooses his consumption c1 in the first period. In the second
period, either he survives and consumes his wealth, or dies, and his wealth is transmitted
to his heirs, for whom he may care. To account for the potential existence of annuities, we
assume that the return to saving may depend on whether the agent survives or not. More
precisely, if we denote by ca2 second-period consumption in the case where the agent is alive,
and by cd2 the amount transmitted to his heirs if he dies, we have:
ca2 = (1 +Ra)(W − c1)
cd2 = (1 +Rd)(W − c1)
where Ra and Rd are the returns obtained respectively in the case of survival and death. We
assume that Ra > −1 and Rd ≥ −1, but make no assumptions about the relative values of
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Ra and Rd. When there are no annuities or taxes on bequests we have Ra = Rd, while with
perfect annuities we have Ra > Rd = −1. There are also many intermediary situations (e.g.
when there are taxes on bequests) or contracts (death insurance) with Rd greater than Ra.
We now apply our model-free result to show that risk aversion produces an unambiguous
result. Formally, the set X has to be defined to reflect the specificity of the context. The
second-period outcome can no longer be described by a scalar variable c2, but by a pair
(c2, σ) of a scalar c2 and a binary variable σ ∈ {a, d} indicating whether the individual is
dead or alive. This means that X = (R+)2 × {a, d}. The notation (c1, c2)a and (c1, c2)d will
however be used instead of the cumbersome (c1, c2, a) and (c1, c2, d). The index a or d thus
indicates whether the individual is alive or not in the second period.
We make three assumptions regarding death. First, we suppose that the agent is always
better off when alive. This simply means that the agent prefers to live in the second period
and to consume, rather than to die and bequeath his wealth. Second, we suppose that optimal
saving conditional on living for two periods is greater than optimal saving conditional on
living one period. In other words, in a deterministic setting, the propensity to consume falls
with life duration. This seems a very natural assumption in this setting, where agents have
no second-period income. Last, we introduce a convexity assumption similar to Assumption
F. Note however that X is not a convex set, and is not even connected. The assumption of
convexity is only meaningful when considering convex subsets of X such as (R+)2×{a} and
(R+)2 × {d}. Our assumptions can be formalized as follows:
Assumption H (Assumptions regarding ordinal preferences) Ordinal preferences sat-
isfy the following:
• The agent is always better off when alive: ∀c1, (c1, (1 + Ra)(W − c1))a  (c1, (1 +
Rd)(W − c1))d
• For i = a, d, all W > 0 and Ra, Rd ≥ −1, the problem maxs u(W − s, (1 + Ri)s)i has
a unique solution denoted by si.
• Optimal saving when surviving is always greater than that when dying: sa > sd.
• Ordinal preferences are convex over both (R+)2 × {a} and (R+)2 × {d}.
Given Assumption H, Proposition 2 allows us to determine how the savings of an agent
facing an uncertain lifetime depend on risk aversion.
Proposition 5 (Saving when lifetime is uncertain) We consider two agents A and B,
who face an (identical) exogenous risk of dying after the first period. They have to choose
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a saving level of s providing them with a consumption profile of (W − s, (1 +Ra)s)a if they
survive and a consumption-bequest profile of (W − s, (1 +Rd)s)d if they die. If:
1. The ordinal preference relationship  satisfies Assumption H.
2. Risk preferences A and B satisfy the ordinal dominance Property 3 and define op-
timal savings sA and sB.
Then the following holds:
Agent A is more risk-averse than agent B =⇒ sA ≤ sB
Proof. Assumptions B and C hold by construction of the consumption profile and the
convexity of preferences. Assumptions D and E directly stem from Assumption H. The
result is then straightforward from Proposition 2.
The more risk-averse agent saves less. In other words, when mortality is taken into
account, there is a positive relationship between risk aversion and impatience. We shall
however emphasize that Proposition 5 assumes that A and B have the same probability of
dying. The relation between risk aversion and impatience holds when comparing agents with
identical mortality, but can not be applied to any correlations obtained from individuals with
different mortality risks.10
5 Conclusion
In everyday life agents take actions which may enhance or reduce the uncertainty concerning
the future. It is however difficult to imagine actions that eliminate uncertainty entirely. As
a result, in order to have some applicability, the concept of risk aversion should reflect the
willingness to reduce risks, and not only the willingness to avoid all sources of risk by choosing
a certain outcome. Nonetheless, one popular approach to quantifying (and comparing)
agents’ risk aversion involves focusing on how individuals compare lotteries with certain
outcomes. All of the definitions which are based on risk premia or certainty equivalents
proceed in this way. It is then implicitly taken for granted that a greater willingness to
avoid all sources of risk implies a greater willingness to marginally decrease risk. This turns
out to be true when a number of additional assumptions are introduced. It is for example
the case when assuming that agents are expected-utility maximizers. However, there is
10In particular, the fact that women might seem to be more patient and less risk-averse than men should
not be interpreted as contradicting this proposition. This could in fact follow from gender differences in
mortality.
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no reason to believe that this always holds. In particular, considering extremely simple
random objects (heads or tails gambles), for which the definition of an increase in risk is
undisputable, preferences in Selden’s framework, and in particular those associated with
Epstein and Zin utility functions, have been shown to be not properly ordered in terms of
aversion for (marginal) increases in risk. These preferences are well-ordered in terms of the
willingness to opt for certain outcomes, but not for the willingness to (marginally) reduce
the degree of risk taking. These classes of utility functions are therefore inadequate for
the analysis of risk aversion in situations where it is not possible (or simply not optimal)
to choose risk-free outcomes. Considering savings behavior shows that this inadequacy is
not only an intellectual curiosity, but that it can also prevent us from reaching the correct
conclusions about the role of risk aversion, as illustrated by Kimball and Weil (2009).
A better approach to risk aversion may then consist in focusing on utility functions that
are correctly ordered in terms of aversion to increases in risk, as in Kihlstrom and Mirman
utility functions, or Quiggin utility functions. This may be sufficient to establish negative
results about risk aversion, for example showing that risk aversion has an ambiguous effect
on a given behavior. However, in the case where a positive result is obtained, we cannot
be sure whether this illustrates a general consequence of risk aversion or whether it is a
consequence of the particular model of rationality under consideration. Moreover, analytical
results often make use of unnecessary regularity conditions, tend to focus on small risks, and
may be more difficult to understand. It is not always obvious to infer from an analytical
expression the assumptions that generated a particular result.
The approach that we develop in this paper is model-free. We have shown that in many
cases it is possible to derive unambiguous results about the impact of risk aversion without
assuming a particular form of rationality. The basic intuition is that increasing risk aversion
should increase the willingness to redistribute from good states to bad states of the world,
in order to reduce the dispersion of ex-post utilities. This statement obviously presupposes
that states of the world can be ordered from bad to good, independently of the actions that
are taken, and can therefore not be applied in all cases. However, as our formal result shows,
it applies under very minimal conditions, and allows us to deal with a number of interesting
problems, such as precautionary savings, savings with uncertain lifetimes, and savings with
uncertain returns.
The applications that we develop in this paper are of interest in their own right. First, we
have shown that risk aversion increases precautionary savings. We believe that this clarifies
the link between prudence and risk aversion. Agents may be prudent or imprudent in the
sense that they may react positively or negatively to an increase in income uncertainty. Drèze
and Modigliani (1972) and Kimball (1990) have established the conditions for prudence to
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occur in the expected utility framework. Our results complement their findings by showing
that, for a given level of income uncertainty, increasing risk aversion leads to increased
savings. As such, the precautionary savings associated with a given income uncertainty
increases in risk aversion.
Second, when the returns on saving are uncertain, our straightforward prediction is that
risk aversion has either a positive or a negative impact, depending on the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. This finding extends those of Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974) under
expected utility, but differs from those of Langlais (1995) who considered Selden utility
functions, which are not well ordered in terms of risk aversion.
Last, considering savings with an uncertain lifetime, we have shown that independently
of the existence of an annuity market, and of whether agents derive utility from bequests,
the greater is risk aversion, the less the agent saves. This underlines that, once mortality is
taken into account, there is a positive relation between risk aversion and impatience.
One strength of these results is that they have been established without assuming any
given model of rationality (e.g.: expected utility), and without considering small risks. We
should also emphasize the simplicity with which they have been derived. Thus far, we have
illustrated our work by looking at simple problems (savings in a two-period framework),
as this allows us to highlight the interest of our formal approach in a simple way. The
advantage of using a model-free approach, instead of a parametric model, may be even
greater when looking at more complex issues, such as savings in N -period models, where
it is simple to extend our results. On the contrary the increase in complexity appears to
be much greater when using parametric approaches – as illustrated by the lack of results
in the economic literature. This is because the key assumptions that are required, such as
good normality, are relatively cumbersome to express in terms of utility once we abandon
the two-period framework (unless very strong assumptions on the structure of the utility
function are introduced). Opting for a model-free approach makes it possible to emphasize
the true economic assumptions that are required (e.g. good normality), without paying the
cost of translating these assumptions into complex properties of utility functions.
Appendix
A Proof of Result 2
We consider each utility class in turn.
1. Kihlstrom and Mirman utility functions.
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We define kA = k ◦ kB where ◦ denotes the composition operator. The function k is
increasing and continuous.
The utility associated to a gamble (xl;xh) for agent A is:
UKMkA (xl;xh) = k
−1
A
(
kA(xl) + kA(xh)
2
)
• We first show that if k concave then A is more risk-averse than B.
Assume that k is concave and consider two gambles (xl;xh) and (yl; yh). We need to
show that if (xl;xh) ` (yl; yh) and A prefers (xl;xh) to (yl; yh) then B prefers (xl;xh)
to (yl; yh). By definition:
The agent A prefers (xl;xh) to (yl; yh) iff:
k (kB(xl)) + k (kB(xh))
2
≥ k (kB(yl)) + k (kB(yh))
2
(8)
The agent B prefers (xl;xh) to (yl; yh) iff:
kB(xl) + kB(xh)
2
≥ kB(yl) + kB(yh)
2
(9)
Since xl < yl ≤ yh < xh and kB is increasing, the inequality in (8) becomes:
k (kB(xh))− k (kB(yh))
kB(xh)− kB(yh) ≥
k (kB(yl))− k (kB(xl))
kB(yl)− kB(xl)
kB(yl)− kB(xl)
kB(xh)− kB(yh)
(if kB(xh) = kB(yh) or kB(xl) = kB(yl), the result is straightforward)
k is concave, which implies that 0 ≤ k(kB(xh))−k(kB(yh))
kB(xh)−kB(yh) ≤
k(kB(yl))−k(kB(xl))
kB(yl)−kB(xl) . We then
deduce that:
1 ≥ kB(yl)− kB(xl)
kB(xh)− kB(yh) or kB(xl) + kB(xh) ≥ kB(yl) + kB(yh)
which implies that the inequality in (9) holds, and thus B prefers (xl;xh) to (yl; yh).
• We now show that the concavity of k is a necessary condition for A to be more risk-
averse than B. Suppose that the inequality in (8) and (xl;xh) ` (yl; yh) imply the
inequality in (9). We choose a level of income y = yl = yh such that the inequality
in (8) holds with equality for a given pair xl, xh. The inequality in (9) then implies
that k(kB(xl)+kB(xh)
2
) ≥ k(kB(y)) ≥ k(kB(xl))+k(kB(xh))2 , or that k is concave. Indeed, a
continuous function f is concave iff for all x1, x2, f
(
x1+x2
2
) ≥ f(x1)+f(x2)
2
.
2. Quiggin anticipated utility function.
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We consider two different gambles (xl;xh) ` (yl; yh) (xl < yl ≤ yh < xh; as before, the
result is straightforward to prove if there is equality), such that agent A prefers (xl;xh) to
(yl; yh). The utility associated with the gamble (xl;xh) for A is:
UQ
φA
(xl;xh) = xl + (xh − xl)φA(1
2
)
Agent A prefers (xl;xh) to (yl; yh) iff UQφA(xl;xh) ≥ U
Q
φA
(yl; yh) or:
φA(
1
2
) ≥ yl − xl
xh − yh + yl − xl
It is then straightforward that agent B prefers (xl;xh) to (yl; yh) iff φB(12) ≥ φA(12).
B Proof of Result 3
We prove the result for each utility class.
1. Kihlstrom and Mirman utility functions.
1. a. The first implication stems directly from our previous Result 2.
1. b. We prove the reverse implication. We suppose that kA is more concave than kB.
Thus, there exists a continuous, increasing, concave function k such that kA = k ◦ kB. We
consider two lotteries L1 and L2, such that: L1 `p L2 and L1 A L2. As agent A prefers L1
to L2, we have: ∫ ∞
−∞
k
(
kB(u)
)
dFL1(u) ≥
∫ ∞
−∞
k
(
kB(u)
)
dFL2(u)
Since L1 `p L2 there exists u0 ∈ R, such that FL1(u0) = FL2(u0) = p. Additionally,
FL1(u) ≥ FL2(u) for u ≤ u0 and FL1(u) ≤ FL2(u) for u ≥ u0. Splitting both of the preceding
integrals in u0, we deduce:∫ u0
−∞
k
(
kB(u)
)
dG−(u) ≥
∫ ∞
u0
k
(
kB(u)
)
dG+(u) (10)
where: G+(u) = FL2(u)− FL1(u) and G−(u) = FL1(u)− FL2(u) (11)
Functions G+ and G− satisfy G+(+∞) = G+(u0) = 0 = G−(u0) = G−(−∞), as well as
G+(u) ≥ 0 for u ≥ u0 and G−(u) ≥ 0 for u ≤ u0.
A concave (or convex) function defined over an open set admits left and right derivatives
everywhere. Both are equal to each other and the function is differentiable, except on a
countable set.11 In consequence, we deduce that there exists a (countable) partition {sj, j ∈
11This result stems for example from Theorem 1.3.7 p. 23 in Nicolescu and Persson (2006)
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N} of ]u0,∞[, such that k and kB are differentiable on every interval ]sj, sj+1[. We deduce:∫ ∞
u0
k
(
kB(u)
)
dG+(u) =
∞∑
j=0
∫ sj+1
sj
k
(
kB(u)
)
dG+(u)
=
∞∑
j=0
(
k
(
kB(sj+1)
)
G+(sj+1)− k
(
kB(sj)
)
G+(sj)
)
−
∞∑
j=0
∫ sj+1
sj
kB′(u) k′
(
kB(u)
)
G+(u)du
We first have G+(+∞) = G+(u0) = 0 and G+(u) ≥ 0 for u ≥ u0. Since k is increasing,
concave and admits left and right derivatives everywhere, we also have for u ≥ u0, 0 ≤
k′
(
kB(u)
) ≤ k′,r (kB(u0)), where k′,r (kB(u0)) is the right derivative of k in kB(u0). We
therefore deduce that:∫ ∞
u0
k
(
kB(u)
)
dG+(u) = −
∞∑
j=0
∫ sj+1
sj
kB′(u) k′
(
kB(u)
)
G+(u)du ≤ 0
and
∫ ∞
u0
k
(
kB(u)
)
dG+(u) ≥ − k′,r (kB(u0)) ∞∑
j=0
∫ sj+1
sj
kB′(u)G+(u)du
We proceed in a reverse way to integrate by parts u 7→ kB′(u)G+(u) and deduce:
0 ≥
∫ ∞
u0
k
(
kB(u)
)
dG+(u) ≥ k′,r (kB(u0)) ∫ ∞
u0
kB(u)dG+(u)
Analogously, we obtain the following inequality for the left-hand side of (10):∫ u0
−∞
k
(
kB(u)
)
dG−(u) ≤ k′,l(kB(u0))
∫ u0
−∞
kB(u) dG−(u) ≤ 0
where k′,l is the left derivative of k
Plugging these two inequalities into (10) yields:
0 ≥ k′,l(kB(u0))
∫ u0
−∞
kB(u) dG−(u) ≥ k′,r(kB(u0))
∫ ∞
u0
kB(u) dG+(u)
Since k is increasing and concave, k′,l(kB(u0)) ≥ k′,r(kB(u0)) ≥ 0. Moreover, both
integrals
∫ u0
−∞ k
B(u)dG−(u) and
∫∞
u0
kB(u)dG+(u) are negative. We deduce:
0 ≥
∫ u0
−∞
kB(u) dG−(u) ≥
∫ ∞
u0
kB(u) dG+(u)
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Expressing G− and G+ as functions of FL1 and FL2 and bringing together the integrals
gives us: ∫ ∞
−∞
kB(u)F ′L1(u)du ≥
∫ ∞
−∞
kB(u)F ′L2(u)du
This inequality states that agent B prefers lottery L1 to L2, proving the result.
2. Quiggin anticipated utility functions.
2.a. First implication.
We use a proof strategy here which is very similar to Chateauneuf, Cohen, and Meilijson
(2004). Assume that agent A is more risk-averse than agent B. We denote by UQ
φi
, i = A,B
their respective Quiggin anticipated utility functions.
We consider lotteries with four possible outcomes. L1 is a lottery paying x1 < x2 < x3 <
x4 with respective probabilities p1, p2, p3, and p4 = 1 − p1 − p2 − p3. L2 is a lottery which
pays the outcomes x1, x2 − ε2, x3 + ε3, x4 with the same probabilities, with ε2, ε3 > 0 and
small enough to respect the initial outcome order. Unambiguously, L2 is a (p1 + p2)−spread
of L1.
The utility of A associated with L1 is written as:
UQ
φA
(L1) = −x1(φA(1− p1)− φA(1))− x2(φA(1− p1 − p2)− φA(1− p1))
− x3(φA(1− p1 − p2 − p3)− φA(1− p1 − p2))− x4(φA(0)− φA(1− p1 − p2 − p3))
= x1 + (x2 − x1)φA(p2 + p3 + p4) + (x3 − x2)φA(p3 + p4) + (x4 − x3)φA(p4)
= x1 + (x2 − x1)φA(q2) + (x3 − x2)φA(q3) + (x4 − x3)φA(q4)
where: pj = qj − qj+1 with 1 = q1 ≥ q2 ≥ q3 ≥ q4 ≥ q5 = 0
We choose ε3 such that agent A is indifferent between L2 and L1. Agent A being more
risk-averse than B, B prefers L2 to L1. Noting φA = φ◦φB (which implies that φ is increasing
and continuous), we have the following two relationships:
ε3
(
φ ◦ φB(q3)− φ ◦ φB(q4)
)
= ε2
(
φ ◦ φB(q2)− φ ◦ φB(q3)
)
ε3
(
φB(q3)− φB(q4)
) ≥ ε2 (φB(q2)− φB(q3))
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Substituting the first equality (φB(q2) ≥ φB(q3) ≥ φB(q4) since φB is increasing) yields:
φ ◦ φB(q2)− φ ◦ φB(q3)
φB(q2)− φB(q3)
≥ φ ◦ φ
B(q3)− φ ◦ φB(q4)
φB(q3)− φB(q4)
φ ◦ φB(q2)
φB(q2)− φB(q3)
+
φ ◦ φB(q4)
φB(q3)− φB(q4)
≥ φ ◦ φB(q3) φ
B(q2)− φB(q4)
(φB(q3)− φB(q4))(φB(q2)− φB(q3))
φB(q3)− φB(q4)
φB(q2)− φB(q4)
φ ◦ φB(q2) + φ
B(q2)− φB(q3)
φB(q2)− φB(q4)
φ ◦ φB(q4) ≥ φ ◦ φB(q3)
Since φ
B(q3)−φB(q4)
φB(q2)−φB(q4) > 0 and
φB(q2)−φB(q3)
φB(q2)−φB(q4) > 0, the last inequality states that φ is a convex
function.
2.b. Second implication.
We suppose that φA is more convex than φB. There thus exists a continuous, increasing,
convex function φ, such that φA = φ ◦ φB and φ(0) = 0 and φ(1) = 1. We consider two
lotteries L1 and L2, such that: L1 `p L2 and L1 A L2. Stating that agent A prefers L1 to
L2 yields, using Quiggin’s functional forms:
−
∫ ∞
−∞
u d
(
φ
(
φB(1− FL1(u))
)) ≥ − ∫ ∞
−∞
u d
(
φ
(
φB(1− FL2(u))
))
Since L1 `p L2 there exists u0 ∈ R, such that FL1(u0) = FL2(u0) = p. Additionally,
1− FL2(u) ≥ 1− FL1(u) for u ≤ u0 and 1− FL2(u) ≤ 1− FL1(u) for u ≥ u0. We deduce:
−
∫ u0
−∞
u d
(
φ
(
φB(1− FL1(u))
))− ∫ ∞
u0
u d
(
φ
(
φB(1− FL1(u))
)) ≥
−
∫ u0
−∞
u d
(
φ
(
φB(1− FL2(u))
))− ∫ ∞
u0
u d
(
φ
(
φB(1− FL2(u))
))
u0
(
1− φ (φB(1− FL1(u0))))− ∫ u0
−∞
(
1− φ (φB(1− FL1(u)))) du
+ u0φ
(
φB(1− FL1(u0))
)
+
∫ ∞
u0
φ
(
φB(1− FL1(u))
)
du ≥
u0
(
1− φ (φB(1− FL2(u0))))− ∫ u0
−∞
(
1− φ (φB(1− FL2(u)))) du
+ u0φ
(
φB(1− FL2(u0))
)
+
∫ ∞
u0
φ
(
φB(1− FL2(u))
)
du
−
∫ u0
−∞
(
1− φ (φB(1− FL1(u)))) du+ ∫ ∞
u0
φ
(
φB(1− FL1(u))
)
du ≥
−
∫ u0
−∞
(
1− φ (φB(1− FL2(u)))) du+ ∫ ∞
u0
φ
(
φB(1− FL2(u))
)
du
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Finally, we obtain:∫ u0
−∞
[
φ
(
φB(1− FL2(u))
)− φ (φB(1− FL1(u)))] du ≤∫ ∞
u0
[
φ
(
φB(1− FL1(u))
)− φ (φB(1− FL2(u)))] du (12)
Focusing on the left-hand side, we deduce:∫ u0
−∞
[
φ
(
φB(1− FL2(u))
)− φ (φB(1− FL1(u)))] du =∫ u0
−∞
(
φB(1− FL2(u))− φB(1− FL1(u))
) φ (φB(1− FL2(u)))− φ (φB(1− FL1(u)))
φB(1− FL2(u))− φB(1− FL1(u))
du
We use a similar argument as in the Kihlstrom and Mirman case. We denote φB(1 −
FLi(u)) = 1− ti (for i = 1, 2). Since φB is increasing, 0 ≤ t2 ≤ t1 ≤ 1−φB(1− p) for u ≤ u0.
We then focus on ψ(t1)−ψ(t2)
t1−t2 , where ψ(t) = −φ(1 − t) is increasing and concave. We can
find a lower bound for this expression, which is ψ′,l(1− φB(1− p)) = φ′,r(φB(1− p)). Since
φB(1− FL2(u)) ≥ φB(1− FL1(u)) for u ≤ u0, we deduce:∫ u0
−∞
[
φ
(
φB(1− FL2(u))
)− φ (φB(1− FL1(u)))] du ≥
φ′,r(φB(1− p))
∫ u0
−∞
[
φB(1− FL2(u))− φB(1− FL1(u))
]
du
Focusing on the right-hand side of (12), we similarly obtain:∫ ∞
u0
[
φ
(
φB(1− FL1(u))
)− φ (φB(1− FL2(u)))] du =∫ ∞
u0
(
φB(1− FL1(u))− φB(1− FL2(u))
) φ (φB(1− FL1(u)))− φ (φB(1− FL2(u)))
φB(1− FL1(u))− φB(1− FL2(u))
du
We similarly denote φB(1−FLi(u)) = 1−xi (for i = 1, 2), with 1−φB(1−p) ≤ x1 ≤ x2 ≤ 1.
We focus on ψ(x2)−ψ(x1)
x2−x1 , where ψ(t) = −φ(1 − t) is increasing and concave. We can find a
upper bound for this expression, which is ψ′,r(1− φB(1− p)) = φ′,l(φB(1− p)). We deduce
because φB(1− FL1(u)) ≥ φB(1− FL2(u)) for u ≥ u0:∫ ∞
u0
[
φ
(
φB(1− FL1(u))
)− φ (φB(1− FL2(u)))] du ≤
φ′,l(φB(1− p))
∫ ∞
u0
(
φB(1− FL1(u))− φB(1− FL2(u))
)
du
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The inequality (12) becomes:
φ′,r(φ(1− p))
∫ u0
−∞
[
φB(1− FL2(u))− φB(1− FL1(u))
]
du ≤
φ′,l(φB(1− p))
∫ ∞
u0
(
φB(1− FL1(u))− φB(1− FL2(u))
)
du
Since φ is convex and increasing, we have 0 ≤ φ′,l(1− φB(p)) ≤ φ′,r(1− φB(p)). Because
both integrals are positive, this yields:∫ u0
−∞
[
φB(1− FL2(u))− φB(1− FL1(u))
]
du ≤
∫ ∞
u0
(
φB(1− FL1(u))− φB(1− FL2(u))
)
du
We carry out the same manipulations in reverse order and deduce:
−
∫ ∞
−∞
u d
(
φB (1− FL1(u))
) ≥ − ∫ ∞
−∞
u d
(
φB (1− FL2(u))
)
Agent B therefore prefers lottery L1 to L2, which completes the proof.
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